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Aloha
And, fourth, even if the above difficulties could somehow be resolved, one
must wonder whether the courts would look with disfavor on such a case be-
cause of the impact it would have on an already critical overcrowding crisis
in our court system. 57
Conclusion
Clearly the Hawaii case did not ask the Court to go so far as to create such a
procedural hybrid. The significance of the case is that it typifies the dif-
ficulty in the mass consumer area where procedural rules greatly complicate
successful suits. Hawaii's novel assertion of damage to its general economy
was one attempt to make inroads into an area shielded from consumer suits
by these rules. The Court's decision in Hawaii has narrowed the area in
which recovery can be had, while endorsing the use of class action suits to
remedy antitrust offenses. The result is that, barring legislative action, the
victim is no better off than he was before, and must depend upon the un-
predictable class action device in seeking relief.
David M. Fuller
Joseph A. Condo
Virginia's Intrafamily Immunity Decisions: What Public Policy
Giveth, Will the Insurance Policy Taketh Away?
In two short opinions, the Virginia Supreme Court has effortlessly over-
turned several aspects of personal injury law in that state. If the court's
philosophy is allowed to stand, the changes promise considerable impact on
her citizens, including those who will never be involved in tort litigation.
The court in Smith v. Kauffman1 and Surratt v. Thompson2 declared that
conditions in the state had developed to the point where intrafamily im-
ficient expertise to undertake the management of antitrust cases, in addition to ful-
filling all other public functions that are required of them.
57. One reference to the burdens imposed on the courts by consumer class actions
was made by Chief Justice Warren Burger in his 1970 "State of the Judiciary" address
to the American Bar Association. 56 A.B.AJ. 929, 932 (1970).
1. 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971).
2. 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971).
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munity to tort liability no longer served the needs of the people, and thus
public policy dictated that Virginia join a growing minority of states which
had also removed the last remnants of crumbling, once impenetrable doc-
trines.
Intrafamily tort immunity in Virginia had two distinct aspects: it provided
parents with a defense against suits brought by their children, and it pro-
vided husbands with the same immunity against suits brought by their wives.
These are the two aspects of the intrafamily barrier still recognized by most
states; however, cracks in the wall prior to these two decisions had already
appeared in Virginia, and other aspects had disappeared altogether, as will
be discussed below.
Smith did away-at least for the moment-with parental immunity; and
Surratt accomplished the same for spousal immunity. This note will try to
predict the effect of these decisions and the durability of the policies lying
behind them.
Parental Immunity and the Smith Case
The origin and development of the doctrine of parental immunity have been
ably discussed in numerous publications3 and it would serve no useful pur-
pose to trace it in detail again. Briefly, the doctrine originated4 in Missis-
sippi with Hewlett v. George.5 An unemancipated minor, confined to an in-
sane asylum, attempted to bring an action against her mother for false im-
prisonment. Without precedent, the court denied the action for policy rea-
sons: it would be disruptive of family peace and the peace of society. The
court asserted that a complete remedy lay through the criminal laws and
thus a resort to civil courts was both unnecessary and unwise.
As other courts quickly followed Hewlett's lead,6 citing it as authority and
adopting its policy, additional bases for the doctrine appeared: the danger
of eroding parental control and authority, the possibility of collusion and
fraud, and depletion of family funds were the most important.7
3. E.g., McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HLv. L.
REv. 1030 (1930); McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L. Ruv. 521
(1960); Maliner, Intrafamily Immunity Doctrine: The Breached Wall, 5 THE FORUM 58
(1969); Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. REv. 823 (1956);
Note, A Child's Rights Against His Parent: Evolution of the Parental Immunity Doc-
trine, 1967 ILL. L. FORUM 805 (1967).
4. There have been suggestions that the doctrine is rooted in the common law, but
the Virginia court in Smith specifically rejected that possibility in reaching its deci-
sion.
5. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885'(1891).
6. E.g., McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
7. McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L. REV. 521 (1960).
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Obliquely and somewhat late, Virginia first adopted the doctrine in
1934, in Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Gretakis.8 After a collision between
Gretakis' automobile and a railroad car, Gretakis was found guilty of 90
percent of the total negligence, and the railroad contributorily negligent of
the remainder. Gretakis' minor daughter, injured in the collision, sued the
railroad and recovered a $1500 judgment. The railroad then filed a bill
asking 90 percent contribution of the $1500 from Gretakis. The court sus-
tained defendant's demurrer on the grounds that "an unemancipated minor
child cannot sue his or her parent to recover for personal injuries resulting
from an ordinary act of negligence," citing "the great weight of authority."9
However, the court did not adopt the doctrine wholeheartedly, refusing
to extend immunity to cases where the parent had emancipated the child,
or where the two had assumed a master-servant relationship. Virginia could
also rely on the weight of authority for these exceptions: 10 given the ex-
tremes to which some courts had pushed the immunity," the validity of
the justifications for the broad doctrine had already begun to be ques-
tioned.12
Five years after backing into the doctrine via the contribution statute in
Gretakis, the court in 1939 was confronted with the concept head on in
Worrell v. Worrell.'3  There, a student who was returning to college on a
bus owned by her father was injured as a result of the driver's negligence.
She sued and recovered against both her father and the driver; on appeal,
the court undertook "a careful examination of authority and precedent.' 14
The defendant had relied on Gretakis; but as the court pointed out,
"[an examination of the cases cited in [Gretakis] discloses that the court
had in mind the qualifications which attend the rule, that is, that the rule is
not to be regarded as absolute, but qualified."' 5  In sustaining her judg-
ment, the court grounded its reasoning on the family peace and the family
funds rationales.
Thus Virginia was, paradoxically, simultaneously solidifying and crack-
ing the wall of immunity: while on the one hand adopting and affirming the
doctrine, its opinions reflected an uneasiness with the policy by emphasizing
8. 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934).
9. Id. at 600, 174 S.E. at 842.
10. Id.
11. E.g., in Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242 (1905), the plaintiff had been raped by
her father. The court felt it would disturb family tranquility to allow her action
against him.
12. A long list of courts and commentators attacking the doctrine was compiled by
Justice Jacobs in his dissent to Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960).
13. 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939).
14. Id. at 18, 4 S.E.2d at 345.
15. Id. at 24, 4 S.E.2d at 348.
1972]
Catholic University Law Review
its specific exceptions and implying that there might be others of a more
general nature. 16 This preservation of flexibility would serve the court well
in Smith, although litigants and courts in the interim surely felt some uncer-
tainty.
In 1960, the court performed its crack-and-solidify feat again by cleaving
to the doctrine while rejecting it as a defense in Midkif v. Midkiff, 17 when
it held that an unemancipated infant may maintain a tort action against his
unemancipated brother. The court specifically rejected any notions the de-
fendant may have had about the relevance of other intrafamily barriers:
The suggested analogy of suits for personal injuries between
husband and wife or parent and child has no application. Even
though a husband and wife or parent and unemancipated child are
not permitted to sue each other for personal injuries in this state,
it does not follow that an unemancipated infant cannot sue his un-
emancipated brother ... .18
The court saw this not as an exception to the court-created immunity doc-
trine, but as an action permissible at common law and unchanged today.
However, it would appear that the policy reasons given for denying other
intrafamily suits-e.g., tranquility and fraud-would apply just as strongly
to suits between siblings.
The significance of Midkiff, then, is that the court asserted that it could
overcome these objections by reasoning that disruption of family harmony
"is no more than a speculative assumption" and that "there is no logical rea-
son for denying an unemancipated infant the right to sue his unemancipated
brother for a tort because of possible disruption of family harmony." 19
Further, the argument that intrafamily tort actions
...would open the door to fraud and collusion, because of lia-
bility insurance, is based purely on an assumption. Fraud is never
presumed. There is no more danger of fraud and collusion be-
tween minor brothers than there is between a minor brother and
an adult brother, other relatives, host and passenger, or intimate
friends, where actions are permitted. Courts should not immunize
tort-feasors because of the possibility of fraud or collusion. ... If
actions were barred because of the possibility of fraud many wrongs
would be permitted to go without redress. . . . If fraud and collu-
sion do exist in an action between brothers, they may be ferreted
out in the same manner in which courts handle that situation in
other cases. 20
16. As the court in Smith observed, the lower court held alternatively that the
plaintiff could not bring the action; or if she could, it was barred on other grounds.
17. 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875 (1960).
18. Id. at 832, 113 S.E.2d at 877.
19. Id. at 833, 113 S.E.2d at 878.
20. Id. (emphasis added).
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The court did not mention its parental immunity rule when rebutting these
defenses, implying that the rule there was grounded in "the problem of
parental discipline and support." 21  It could hardly say otherwise, having
generally dismissed the tranquility and fraud grounds in MidkifI. Since the
court added flatly that "[a]n unemancipated child cannot sue his parent
for a personal tort," 22 citing Gretakis, the only two policy barriers remaining
were, therefore, preservation of parental authority and the family exchequer.
This then was the climate in 1971 when the Smith case was presented to
the court. Christine Smith was injured in an automobile accident resulting
from her stepfather's negligence. The trial court held that the stepfather
was immune from liability, and alternately, if the action was maintainable,
the Virginia guest statute 23 required only slight care by the driver toward
his gratuitous passenger.
The court first re-examined the immunity rule, and in reviewing its past
decisions seized on the policy argument behind Worrell to defeat the tran-
quility and exchequer rationale, that is, statutes providing for compulsory
insurance indemnity to passengers evidenced a legislative policy to protect
those passengers from harm.24 Since Virginia in 1958 required automobile
liability policies to include an uninsured motor vehicle endorsement, 25 vir-
tually all 26 registered vehicles now carry this coverage.
The court described the rule of parental immunity as "anachronistic" in
light of the nearly universal insurance coverage. "A rule adopted for the
common good now prejudices the great majority. ' 27  It agreed with the New
Jersey Supreme Court that "[d]omestic harmony may be more threatened
by denying a cause of action than by permitting one where there is insurance
coverage."' 28  Finally, it "followed the precedent" of Worrell (which had at
once affirmed the rule and cracked it by dictum) and abrogated the rule.
Once having done this and allowed the suit, the court permitted seven-year-
old Christine to recover by holding that a child under 14 is incapable of
knowingly and voluntarily becoming a guest in an automobile, thus removing
her from the gross negligence rule.29
The Smith case, then, can be seen as the logical end of a progression of
21. Id. at 832, 113 S.E.2d at 877.
22. Id. at n.2.
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-646.1 (1957).
24. 174 Va. 11, 28, 4 S.E.2d 343, 350 (1939).
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381 (1970).
26. The court cited the figure of 98.43 percent. The remainder either paid a
$50 fee in lieu of the endorsement, posted bond, or qualified as self-insurers.
27. 212 Va. at 185, 183 S.E.2d at 194.
28. Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 490, 267 A.2d 481, 485 (1970).
29. 212 Va. at 187, 183 S.E.2d at 195.
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decisions which, while appearing to affirm the rule, actually chipped away at
it by holding or by dicta. Widespread liability insurance had removed all
but one of the former rationales.30
Spousal Immunity and the Surratt Case
The Surratt case, by contrast, can be seen as a more definite break with
tradition in Virginia. Unlike parental immunity, a husband's immunity
from personal injury suits brought by his wife is rooted in the common law.
At common law, a married woman lacked capacity to sue (or be sued) in
her own name. Husband and wife were legally one person3 1 and thus
neither could sue the other.
However, in the nineteenth century, Married Women's Acts supposedly
freed women to pursue legal actions as though they were single, 32 but the
courts were reluctant to interpret this as including tort actions. In the lead-
ing case of Thompson v. Thompson,33 the U.S. Supreme Court asserted that
while the District of Columbia Code plainly allowed a married woman to
bring tort actions as though she were single, this still barred any cause of
action against her husband. Rather, the statute "freed" women from having
to join their husbands in bringing complaints against third parties. The
Court insisted that before a husband could be held liable to his wife in a tort,
the legislature must clearly indicate its intention to abolish the rule estab-
lished at common law.
While a few courts took a more liberal view, 4 the majority, including Vir-
ginia, felt that since the Acts are in derogation of the common law, they
must be strictly construed so as to preclude wives from suing husbands for
personal injuries.35
Three other grounds advanced for the doctrine of interspousal immunity
included the assertion that criminal and divorce courts provide adequate
30. The problem of parental discipline was not mentioned, although it loomed
large in the Midkiff opinion as discussed in the text. Since the court limited its
holding to the facts-i.e., automobile accidents, it may have felt the discipline rationale
was not relevant in a case confined to these facts.
However, the court in Smith presented the rule as "grounded" solely on the theory
that a suit by a child against his parent ". . . [T]ends to disturb the peace and
tranquility of the home, or disrupt the voluntary and natural course of disposal of the
parents' exchequer," citing Worrell. Yet in Midkiff, the court presented Worrell
as authority for a different rationale: parental discipline.
31. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 442 (1768).
32. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-36 (1969).
33. 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
34. E.g., Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914).
35. Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs, 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918).
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remedies,3 6 family peace, and the danger of fraud and collusion. The first
of these has long since been abandoned as illusory or inadequate;3 7 and
the Virginia court had disposed of the latter two in Smith earlier that same
day.
Thus only the common law hurdle needed to be cleared. The Virginia
constitution"8 and statute39 specify that:
The common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to the
principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this State, shall
continue in full force within the same, and be the rule of decision,
except as altered by the General Assembly.
In the 1918 decision of Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs40 the wife's ad-
ministrator was denied a cause of action because "[a]t common law, hus-
band and wife were, for the most part, regarded as one ... ". , 41 and the
Virginia Married Woman's Act 4 2 did not give, either expressly or by impli-
cation, the wife the right to sue her husband for a personal tort. The 1952
case of Furey v. Furey43 reasserted this view of the Act, noting that in the
34 years between Keister and Furey, the legislature amended the Act three
times in regard to elements of damage recoverable by wives for personal
injury, but no change had given the wife the right to sue her husband for
personal injury. The principle was reaffirmed, by dictum, as recently as
1955 in Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bennett.44
However, in reviewing these holdings, the court in Surratt subtly shifted
its verbal tense, and with that shift changed its view of the common law from
a static body of law to a dynamic one. In looking back at Keister, the court
said, ". . . the then common law conferred no right in the wife. . ."; and
"...the Keister case stands for the proposition that in 1918 the common
law afforded the wife no right. . . ." It then presented the issue in Sur-
rat as "does the common law, as it exists in 1971, cling to the concept.
• . .45 Thus the court freed itself from the constitutional and statutory re-
36. Criminal remedies-see, e.g., Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591
(1924)-and cases cited there at 593. Divorce remedies-see, e.g., Rogers v. Rogers,
265 Mo. 200, 177 S.W. 382 (1915) or Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (1877).
37. Criminal actions do not compensate the victims, nor do divorce actions in this
sense. There may be religious barriers or lack of grounds to a divorce action. A crimi-
nal action requires violation of a statute having penalties of intentional acts. For a
good argument against these "remedies," see Damm v. Elyria Lodge No. 465, 158
Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952).
38. VA. CONST. sched. 3, 1971.
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-10 (1966).
40. 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918).
41. Id. at 176, 96 S.E. at 321.
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-36 (1969).
43. 193 Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (1952).
44. 197 Va. 216, 89 S.E.2d 69 (1955).
45. 212 Va. at 193, 183 S.E.2d at 201 (emphasis added).
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strictions, quoting a New Jersey court opinion which said
One of the great virtues of the common law is its dynamic nature
that makes it adaptable to the requirements of society at the time
of its application in court. The nature of the common law re-
quires that each time a rule of law is applied it be carefully scru-
tinized to make sure that the conditions and needs of the times
have not so changed as to make further application of it the instru-
ment of injustice. .... 40
The Virginia court also defended its view by observing that "[n]othing
in the nature of the common law required us . . . to adhere to a parental
immunity rule [in Smith]. . . . Likewise, nothing in the nature of the
common law requires us to adhere to an outmoded concept [in Surratt].
"47
This overlooks-or ignores-the probability that the parental immunity
rule was never a common law concept! And the court had specifically
adopted that probability in Smith when it said, "[The parental immunity
rule] was followed by many other courts in this country, perhaps under
the mistaken belief that the rule was part of the English common law."'48
However, once the court permitted itself to view the common law as
"dynamic" and as something which could be changed by decision, it was
able to abrogate the spousal immunity rule.
The Impact of the Decisions
Although the court did not appear to struggle in coming to its decisions in
either Smith or Surratt, the former was held by a 4-3 vote, the latter 5-2. 49
And in both decisions, the court restricted its holding to automobile acci-
dents. Will the impact be restricted to that type of case, and how will the
effects be felt?
Commentators have observed5" that while liability in tort is looked on as
shifting a loss that has already occurred from one individual to another,
wherever there is widely held insurance, tort liability no longer merely shifts
the loss but tends to distribute it over society. The person nominally liable
46. State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 505, 129 A.2d 715, 721 (1957).
47. 212 Va. at 194, 183 S.E.2d at 202.
48. Id. at 182, 183 S.E.2d at 192, n.2 (emphasis added).
49. Justices Cochran and Harman concurred in part and dissented in part to both
decisions; Justice I'Anson dissented in Smith only to the guest statute portion of the
opinion.
50. James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948); James and Thornton, The Impact of Insurance on the Law
of Torts, 15 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 431 (1950),
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is often only a conduit through whom this process of distribution starts to
flow.
Thus, a catastrophic loss resulting from an automobile accident will fall
not on the single individual responsible for the mishap, but be spread out
over a large segment of the publi6 through higher insurance rates. Justice
Cochran, dissenting in Surratt,51 felt the decision to so spread the cost among
the citizens to be one of public policy and thus best left to the legislature.
The majority, however, saw in the present automobile insurance require-
ments an already expressed legislative policy to spread losses. The intra-
family barrier was an unfortunate remnant of earlier policy and at odds
with modern legislative intent.
Whether the General Assembly feels that distribution of loss overrides
all other concerns is a question that may be answered in the next session of
the legislature. Three routes are open to that body: overrule the decision
by statute; codify the decision; or do nothing.
If in Smith and Surratt the court read the mood of the Assembly incor-
rectly, the legislature can react as did the Illinois lawmakers after that
state's highest court reached a similar decision: within a year from the de-
cision, a statute was passed which provides that "neither husband nor wife
may sue the other for a tort to the person committed during coverture. '5 2
This route is doubtful, however, given the Virginia legislature's tacit ap-
proval of, or at least acquiesence in, Midkiff, which discarded the disrup-
tion-of-family-peace and collusion arguments. Further, a standard "coop-
eration clause" is already included in Virginia automobile insurance policies
which is designed to prevent collusion. This provision requires the insured to
assist the insurer in defending any action covered by the policy brought against
the insured upon penalty of non-payment by the carrier. 53
If the legislature chooses the second route and codifies the decisions, as
had been done in several states,54 insurance rates will certainly go up, unless
(as is likely) insurers exclude this coverage from their policies.
If the legislature chooses the last route, and does nothing, and the court's
decisions stand as "common law as it exists in 1971," the same results can
51. 212 Va. at 195, 183 S.E.2d at 203.
52. Brandt v. Keller, 413 Ill. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1953) was reversed by ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1959).
53. W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 915-16 (3d ed. 1951).
The effectiveness of such clauses is questionable in less than egregious cases, of course.
54. E.g., New York-Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943),
codified by N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAw § 3-313 (1964); North Carolina-Jernigan v.
Jernigan, 236 N.C. 430, 72 S.E.2d 912 (1952), codified by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5
(1966); Wisconsin-Fehr v. General Accident, F. & L. Assurance Corp., 246 Wis. 228,
16 N.W.2d 787 (1944), codified by Wis. STAT. ANN. § 246.075 (1957).
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be expected as if the legislature codifies the rulings. The insurance car-
riers can simply exclude wives and children from the policy's liability cover-
age. Not until this exclusion has attained widespread adoption in Virginia
does the State Corporation Commission (and, by delegation, the state in-
surance commissioner) take official cognizance of it. Once the exclusion
clause is being used "extensively," 55 the Commission will draw up a stand-
ard clause and publish it. Unless objections to the clause are filed, it be-
comes effective within 30 days.50 Otherwise, hearings are held and the
clause will be rewritten, adopted as is, or rejected altogether. 57 However,
the Commission must determine that such additional provisions do not con-
flict with state law.5s
Thus, under any of the three routes open to the legislature, chances are
excellent that the court's decisions in Smith and Surratt will become mean-
ingless.5 9 This is precisely what has happened elsewhere in some instances.
In New York, for instance, the Domestic Relations Law was amended
in 193960 to authorize suits instituted by the wife against her husband.
However, the Insurance Law was also amended"' to provide that policies
issued to automobile owners need not insure against injuries to the spouse of
the owner. Thus while the wife's right of action is statutorily preserved, the
insurer has the option of excluding her from coverage!
Approval of exclusionary clauses in Virginia would not violate the actual
holdings of these cases, however much violence they might do to the spirit
of the policy behind them. Thus the State Corporation Commission can
determine that these clauses do not conflict with state law. Only if the
legislature forbids such exclusions, as has been done elsewhere, 62 with a
corresponding increase in insurance rates, will the court's reading of public
policy be furthered.
Philip E. Groves
55. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-382 (1970).
56. Id.
57. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-383 (1970).
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-387 (1970).
59. This would appear to be true even if the court's holding is extended to cases
beyond automobile liability, as seems inevitable. (See Justice Harman's dissent to
Smith.) The percentage of citizens carrying personal liability insurance is much
smaller, of course, than those carrying automobile liability insurance.
60. N.Y. LAws, Ch. 669.
61. N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAw § 3-313.
62. MINN. STAT. 474 § 1 (1969) and MINN. STAT. 713 § 3 (1969) prohibit house-
hold exclusion clauses in liability insurance policies, and allow for inclusion of sup-
plemental accident indemnity coverage for members of the household in automobile
liability policies.
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